The outage came from several separate failures lining up:
The impact ran from Thursday evening through Friday. Outlook was down, Teams and Safe Links weren’t working properly, and some people couldn’t log in to other systems because their one-time passcodes arrive by email.
Likely, yes. Cyber policies have two main triggers: the malicious trigger (ransomware, malware, unauthorised access) and the non-malicious trigger, often called system failure. System failure is usually defined as any unintentional or unplanned outage, which is what we would expect to respond here.
Two insuring clauses. Business interruption covers loss of income after an outage of your own systems, plus extra expenses to reduce that loss. Dependent business interruption covers the same losses when a supplier you rely on, such as a technology provider like Microsoft, has the outage.
First, the waiting period: the number of hours before business interruption cover starts. Good policies use 8 to 12 hours, but some competitor policies go up to 48 hours. This outage ran well past 8 to 12 hours. Second, and more importantly, there must be a provable loss. Email is rarely how businesses actually transact sales, so most losses are expected to be small, with more potential under extra expenses than lost income.
The insurer usually pays for a forensic accountant to work with you to quantify the loss. They typically ask for three years of financial information plus your targets and budgets for the affected period, which together form a proof of loss statement for the insurer.
It varies by business. A restaurant or travel business taking bookings by email, for example, should be able to show typical bookings for the period and past booking data, alongside standard figures like revenue, profit and EBITDA.
We recommend thinking about operational continuity:
A detailed business continuity plan should cover all of this, and goes much further than the yes-or-no question insurers often ask.
We expect the same policy mechanics to apply, even at a much larger scale. During COVID, insurers disputed property claims where policies were silent on pandemics, but the courts sided with policyholders. There’s no sign of insurers trying to avoid claims for this outage.
No. The exclusion protects the market from catastrophic systemic events and usually covers three areas: power and utilities, financial market infrastructure, and internet infrastructure. The internet part usually requires an impact on core DNS root servers or the IP addressing system, and there’s no evidence of that here. Microsoft’s services are also not the kind of underlying infrastructure the exclusion is aimed at.
We don’t expect it to. Realistic estimates put insured losses at roughly 30 million to 150 million, which is the kind of event insurers already price in. The contrarian view is that reinsurers fear a cloud provider outage more than anything, so some could get cold feet. But we don’t expect that to happen.
Some businesses used email-based MFA for non-Microsoft apps and couldn’t log in, so they disabled it. Making that risk decision quickly is a sign of a mature organisation. But because policies are built on the controls you declared, removing MFA could amount to a misrepresentation of risk if an attack follows. Our advice: contact your broker as soon as possible so the insurer can give its position before you decide.
It depends on the policy wording, and there are arguments both ways. It could be one claim, because the outage was the proximate cause. Or it could be treated separately, because the breach was caused by the change in security rather than the outage itself. Either way, the key step is telling your insurer, through your broker, so they’re comfortable with the risk.