
GPO Path: Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment Setting: Deny log on locally Value: <org> integration service accounts
net user <org>_sync /expires:06/30/2025
net user <org>_sync /times:M-F,06:00-20:00
GPO Path: Computer Configuration > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Windows Firewall with Advanced Security > Inbound Rules Rule: Allow inbound traffic only from <org> IP ranges to port 443 (HTTPS)
Intune Settings Catalog: Audit Logon Events → Configure "Success" and "Failure"
Intune Settings Catalog: Setting: "Include command line in process creation events" Value: Enabled
Intune > Device Configuration Profile > PowerShell Execution Policy Value: AllSigned
Rule: Deny > User: <org>_sync > Path: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
Intune > Device Configuration Profile > PowerShell Execution Policy Value: AllSigned
Registry: [HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Microsoft\Office\16.0\Excel\Security] "VBAWarnings"=dword:00000004
Conditional Access Policy: Assign to: Group “UNFI_Accounts” Control: Require MFA
Conditional Access → Client App Conditions → Block legacy authentication clients
ID | Technique | Description | Controls | Configurations (SIEM/EDR/MDM) |
---|---|---|---|---|
T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | Uses PowerShell, cmd, and WScript for execution and payload delivery | Monitor and block suspicious script execution | SIEM: spl index=windows EventCode=4104 (Message=”*Invoke*” OR Message=”*DownloadString*” OR Message=”*Base64*” OR Message=”*FromBase64String*”) EDR: ASR Rule 3b576869-a4ec-4529-8536-b80a7769e899 to block Office apps from creating child processes MDM: Use AppLocker to block untrusted script interpreters (e.g., PowerShell, WScript, cscript) |
T1562.001 | Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools | Disables AV/EDR with Set-MpPreference, sc stop, or registry edits | Detect and prevent security tool tampering | SIEM: spl index=windows EventCode=4688 (CommandLine=”*Set-MpPreference*” OR CommandLine=”*Add-MpPreference*”) EDR: Tamper Protection = EnabledReal-time Protection = On MDM: Compliance policy to require EDR ATP risk = “Low”; enforce EDR Real-time Protection |
T1070.004 | Indicator Removal: File Deletion | Deletes Windows event logs and backups using wevtutil, vssadmin, or bcdedit | Monitor for use of destructive utilities | SIEM: spl index=windows (Image=”*vssadmin.exe*” AND CommandLine=”*delete shadows*”) EDR: Alert on vssadmin, bcdedit, wevtutil usage via device timeline MDM: Enforce BitLocker, prevent backup deletion through policies |
T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | Ransomware payload encrypts data on disk | Detect encryption behavior; isolate host quickly | SIEM: Monitor mass file renames or modifications; high entropy in files EDR: Trigger automatic isolation on ransomware detection MDM/hardening: Trigger auto-remediation or quarantine via EDR ATP risk signal |
T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | Base64 and other encoding used to obfuscate scripts | Detect obfuscation patterns in scripting | SIEM: Same query as T1059 above (Base64 indicators) EDR: ASR Rule be9ba2d9-53ea-4cdc-84e5-9b1eeee46550 to block script content from email/webmail MDM/hardening: Block unsigned or untrusted scripts via Device Restriction profiles |
T1055 | Process Injection | Injects into legitimate processes to evade detection and escalate privileges | Monitor for parent-child anomalies | SIEM: Flag unusual process chains (e.g., Office → PowerShell) EDR: EDR alerting for LSASS or memory access manipulation ASR Rule: d4f940ab-401b-4efc-aadc-ad5f3c50688a to block credential theft from LSASS MDM/hardening: Require EDR onboarding; restrict registry access to LSASS |
T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) | Executes scripts and commands remotely for lateral movement | Detect non-standard WMI usage | SIEM: Flag wmic processes launched by non-admins or scripts EDR: Alert on lateral WMI execution in device timeline MDM/hardening: Control WMI usage via controlled folder access and AppLocker rules |
T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | Persistence via Run key or Startup folder | Monitor registry modifications for persistence | SIEM: spl index=windows (RegistryKey=”*\\Run*” OR RegistryKey=”*\\RunOnce*”) EDR: Alert on new autoruns MDM/hardening: Disable legacy autorun functionality in system settings |
T1218 | Signed Binary Proxy Execution | Uses trusted signed tools like rundll32.exe, regsvr32.exe for evasion | Monitor use of signed Windows binaries for unusual activity | SIEM: Detect use of LOLBins like regsvr32.exe, rundll32.exe outside of baseline EDR: Enable detection for Living-Off-the-Land binaries MDM/hardening: Restrict execution via AppLocker or WDAC policies |
T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | Schedules tasks to maintain persistence or execute payloads | Detect creation of suspicious scheduled tasks | SIEM: Monitor Task Scheduler logs or schtasks command usage EDR: Alert on anomalous scheduled tasks MDM/hardening: Monitor and block via AppLocker and Task Scheduler policy settings |
T1036 | Masquerading | Payloads may imitate trusted processes or have misleading file names | Detect unusual parent-child process and image path anomalies | SIEM: Alert on processes executing from unusual paths (e.g., %AppData%, %Temp%) EDR: Enable warnings for unexpected binary locations MDM/hardening: Block unsigned binaries from user-writable directories |